Measuring the degree distribution of routers in the core internet by Latapy, Matthieu et al.
Measuring the degree distribution of routers in the core
internet
Matthieu Latapy, Elie Rotenberg, Christophe Crespelle, Fabien Tarissan
To cite this version:
Matthieu Latapy, Elie Rotenberg, Christophe Crespelle, Fabien Tarissan. Measuring the degree
distribution of routers in the core internet. 13th IFIP International Conference on Networking,
Jun 2014, Trondheim, Norway. IEEE, Proceedings of the 13th IFIP International Conference
on Networking, pp.1-9, 2014, <10.1109/IFIPNetworking.2014.6857096>. <hal-01208359>
HAL Id: hal-01208359
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01208359
Submitted on 2 Oct 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Measuring the Degree Distribution of Routers
in the Core Internet
Matthieu Latapy1 ´Elie Rotenberg1,2 Christophe Crespelle2 Fabien Tarissan1
1. Sorbonne Universite´s, UPMC Universite´ Paris 6
and CNRS, UMR 7606, LIP6, Paris, France
2. Universite´ Claude Bernard Lyon 1, DANTE/INRIA
LIP UMR CNRS 5668, ENS de Lyon, Universite´ de Lyon
Abstract—Most current models of the internet rely on knowl-
edge of the degree distribution of its core routers, which plays a
key role for simulation purposes. In practice, this distribution
is usually observed directly on maps known to be partial,
biased and erroneous. This raises serious concerns on the true
knowledge one may have of this key property. Here, we design an
original measurement approach targeting reliable estimation of
the degree distribution of core routers, without resorting to any
map. It consists in sampling random core routers and precisely
estimate their degree thanks to probes sent from many distributed
monitors. We run and assess a large-scale measurement following
this approach, carefully controlling and correcting bias and
errors encountered in practice. The estimate we obtain is much
more reliable than previous knowledge, and it shows that the true
degree distribution is very different from all current assumptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The internet has become a crucial infrastructure sustaining
our social, economic, cultural and scientific lives at both local
and worldwide scales. Despite this, due to its history, its de-
centralized nature and its mere complexity, our understanding
of its global structure remains very limited. In particular, it is
now clear that precise knowledge of its components (devices,
connections, protocols, etc) is not sufficient to understand its
global structure. As a consequence, much effort is nowadays
devoted to measurements of the internet, aimed at shedding
light on these features [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
One of the main approaches consists in modeling the inter-
net as a graph where nodes are ASes, routers, end-hosts, and/or
other devices, and links are physical connections, AS peering,
IP neighborhood, etc. One then conducts measurements based
typically on traceroute, BGP and/or anti-aliasing in order to
build maps of the internet [2], [6], [7], [1]. These maps are
partial views of the corresponding graphs, and the underlying
object is not always clearly defined [8]. In addition, such
maps may be biased by the measurement procedure [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14]. They contain indeed much erroneous
data, due for instance to silent routers, dynamic routing (load
balancing in particular), incorrect anti-aliasing [15], [16], [17].
This means that the properties of obtained maps may differ
very significantly from the properties of the true graph, in a
way that is extremely difficult to assess and correct.
We explore here a completely new approach, based on
the idea that one does not need a map to estimate a given
property of interest. Instead, we propose to design and perform
a measurement procedure targeting the estimation of a specific
property. The challenge is then to ensure that the measurement
succeeds in giving a reliable estimate.
We focus on the degree distribution of core routers, i.e. the
fraction of core routers with k links for any k. The links we
consider here are the physical links of the router, identified
by its IP interfaces. We design a measurement procedure able
to reliably estimate this distribution. We then develop tools
needed to run it, and perform a large-scale measurement from
hundreds of monitors distributed in the internet. We obtain
this way an estimate of the degree distribution of routers
that is much more reliable than previous knowledge, without
resorting to a map at any stage.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present our
approach in Section II and explore its theoretical relevance
through simulations in Section III. Then we detail the key
elements of the practical implementation: the selection and
assessment of a monitor set in Section IV, the sampling of
random targets and the selection of relevant ones in Section V,
and the derivation of an unbiased estimate from the measure-
ment in Section VI. We finally run our practical measurement
in Section VII, we present obtained results in Section VIII,
and we assess them in Section VIII.
II. OUR APPROACH
Let us consider an IP address t, which we call target, and
let us denote by r(t) the node (router or end-host) to which t
belongs. RFCs [18] and [19] state that when a monitorm sends
an UDP packet with destination t on an unallocated port, then
r(t) should answer with an ICMP Destination Unreachable
(Code 3/Port unreachable) packet to m. An important detail
is that the source of this ICMP packet is in principle the IP
address of the interface i by which r(t) sent it (see Fig. 1).
Let us temporarily assume that r(t) implements this feature
correctly (we handle other cases below). Now consider a set
M of monitors which all send such a probe towards IP address
t. If for each interface i of r(t) there is a monitor m in M
to which r(t) answers using i, then one obtains the set of all
interfaces of r(t), and so its degree. This constitutes our basicISBN 978-3-901882-58-6 c© 2014 IFIP
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Fig. 1. Monitor m sends a UDP packet with destination address t on an
unallocated port; the node r(t) answers with an ICMP packet with source
address i, and thus m discovers interface i of r(t).
r(t′)
r(t)
Fig. 2. Left: a set of monitors (the squared nodes) send probes towards a
target IP address t and obtain the four interfaces of router r(t). Right: the
same monitors send probes towards another target t′ but miss most interfaces
of r(t′).
measurement primitive 1: 1) from each monitor of a set M , we
send a UDP packet to an unallocated port of target IP address
t and 2) we collect the set M(t) of all IP addresses used by
r(t) to answer to monitors in M .
Depending on the target t and on the set of monitors M
this measurement primitive may succeed or fail to discover all
interfaces of r(t). In particular, one has to distinguish between
two drastically different kinds of targets: 1) the target node
r(t) is in the core internet, see Fig. 2 (left) or 2) the target
node r(t) is in the border, see Fig. 2 (right). This distinction
deserves more attention.
Given a graph, let us consider the following pruning process:
iteratively remove all nodes having degree one until there
remains no such nodes. We consider border nodes as being
the ones removed when this process is applied to the physical
internet topology. Core routers are the others. They necessarily
have more than one interface linking them to another core
routers, and we call such interfaces core interfaces. We call
border interfaces all other interfaces, core degree (resp. border
degree) of a node its number of core (resp. border) interfaces,
and we call branching points the core routers that have at
least one border interface. For instance, in Fig. 2, r(t) is a
core router, r(t′) is a border node, and the black node directly
linked to r(t′) is at the same time a core router and a branching
point.
As illustrated in Fig. 2 (right), when the target address
belongs to a border node our measurement primitive misses
most of its interfaces, and most likely discovers only the
interface directed towards the core. This is not an issue here,
as we focus on core routers, which form the key part of the
1This is the converse of a classical anti-aliasing technique, aimed at
identifying IP addresses belonging to a same node in a given set of IP
addresses, see Section X.
network. We will see in Section V how to decide whether a
target address belongs to a border node or not.
The situation regarding core interfaces of core routers is
quite different. Indeed, such interfaces are not only used to
communicate locally with a part of the border; in principle,
they route traffic toward a non-negligible part of the internet,
and one may therefore expect that a reasonably large and
well distributed set M of monitors discovers them. Of course,
this highly depends on the considered set of monitors and on
the topology of the network. This is investigated in depth in
Sections III and IV.
In summary, we expect a good enough set of monitors M to
be able to discover all or almost all core interfaces of any core
router, leading to an estimate of its degree in the core internet
topology. Now if we consider a set T of targets sampled
uniformly at random, independently from their degrees (which
is discussed in Sections VI and V), then the distribution of
degrees observed in T is an estimate of the degree distribution
of core routers (which is more and more accurate as T grows).
Finally, our method to estimate the degree distribution of
internet core routers consists in four steps:
1) obtain a large and well distributed set M of monitors,
2) build a large set T of random target addresses belonging
to core routers,
3) estimate the degree of r(t) for each target t in T using
our measurement primitive,
4) derive from this our estimate of the degree distribution.
III. PROOF OF CONCEPT
Before putting our approach into practice, we first assess
it using simulations in this section. Assuming that we are
able to build appropriate sets of monitors and targets, the key
questions we want to answer are: what is the risk that our
estimate of a node’s degree is different from its real degree,
and how many monitors do we need to have an accurate
estimate of the degree distribution?
To investigate this, we have conducted simulations as fol-
lows (see [20] for more details): we considered different kinds
of artificial graphs to model the topology; we used as monitors
random nodes with degree one (representing end-hosts); and
we used all core targets (i.e. nodes in the graph obtained by
iteratively removing degree-one nodes). We then assumed that
each target answers to probes from each monitor using one
(randomly chosen) of its interface that starts a shortest path
from the target to the monitor. We used two different kinds
of topologies: one with Poisson degree distribution, which is
a typical homogeneous distribution, and one with a power-
law degree distribution, which is a typical heterogeneous
distribution. These two kinds of distributions are considered
as extreme cases for what the actual degree distribution may
be.
Fig. 3 shows the results of the simulations for Poisson and
power-law graphs of 2.5 million nodes. Fig. 3(a) presents
the degree distribution observed with respectively 12, 25,
50, 100, 200, 400 and 800 monitors. As one could expect,
with 12 monitors the degree distribution is poorly estimated
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Fig. 3. Simulations with different number of monitors (12, 25, 50, 100, 200, 400 and 800) over graphs of 2.5 ∗ 106 nodes whose degree distribution follows
either a Poisson law with average degree 25 or a power law with exponent 2.1.
in the two cases. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, even
with this poor level of quality, the nature of the distribution
(i.e. homogeneous or heterogeneous) appears clearly. When
the number of monitors increases, so does the quality of the
observed degree distribution.
With 200 monitors in particular, the observed and the real
distributions become visually indistinguishable in the homoge-
neous case (left). For the heterogeneous case (right), one can
observe a cut-off for very large degrees. As we mentioned
previously, this comes from the limitation of our method we
identified a priori: the observed degree cannot exceed the
number of monitors, and more generally, the estimate becomes
inaccurate for targets whose degree is close to the number of
monitors. On the other hand, for reasonably low-degree targets,
lets say up to 20, the observed distribution and the real one
are visually indistinguishable with 200 monitors.
These last statements are strengthened by the plots on
Fig. 3(b) which shows the scatter plot of real degree (on the
x-axis) and observed degree (on the y-axis) for all targets
and for the two kinds of topologies. We can see that with
200 monitors, the estimate degree of all nodes is quite close
to its real degree for the Poisson graphs, thus proving that
our method performs very well on this kind of topology. As
regards power-law graphs, we can see that using 200 monitors,
the estimate degree of low-degree nodes is quite close to the
real one. More than 95% of degree-2 nodes are correctly
observed and this proportion drops to 85% when considering
all nodes whose degree is lower than 10. This shows that, for
this type of nodes at least, our method performs also very well
on power-law graphs.
Therefore, the only limitation of our method in this the-
oretical setup seems to be the estimation of the degree of
high-degree nodes in power-law graphs. Indeed, an intrinsic
limitation of our method is that we cannot obtain a degree
estimate larger than the number of monitor |M |. However,
this limitation has to be put in perspective as Fig. 3(b) shows
that, even if poorly estimated, they still cannot be confused
with low-degree nodes. Whatever the number of monitors,
the worst estimation (lower point on the y-axis) increases as
the real degree increases. With 200 monitors for instance, the
worst estimate of a node with degree higher than 1000 is 136.
In conclusion, both for Poisson graphs and power-law
graphs, the nature and the shape of the degree distribution
are correctly observed even with a low number of monitors.
In addition, the observed distribution quickly converges to the
real one when the number of monitors grows. The real degree
of low-degree nodes is correctly observed (also true for high-
degree nodes in the homogeneous case), and a high-degree
node is never observed as a low-degree node.
These remarks will turn out to be crucial in Section VIII.
However, the reader may wonder if these results still hold
for graphs of different sizes and with different parameters,
average degree for Poisson graphs and exponent for power-
law graphs. These questions were investigated in [20], as well
as the influence of some other parameters of the simulations. It
turns out that the conclusions we derive here are still valid for
different sizes and parameters. In particular, [20] shows that
the size of the graph has very little importance, if any, for the
quality of the observation with a given number of monitors.
Then, the conclusion obtained by simulations on graphs of a
few millions of nodes still holds for graphs of the size of the
internet.
IV. MONITORS
Our method relies on the use of a large set M of monitors
distributed in the internet. It is crucial that this set is large
enough since the accuracy of the estimation of the degrees of
targets highly depends on this number (see Section III). On
the other hand, having several monitors in the same location
(typically having the same branching point) has limited in-
terest: it is probable that most targets use the same interface
to answer probes coming from these monitors (see Fig. 4).
Assessing the quality of a given set M of monitors (regarding
our measurement goals) is therefore crucial, and we propose
here three different and complementary approaches to do so.
A. Colocated monitors
First notice that any monitor m may in principle be able to
identify its branching point (i.e. the branching point between
itself and core nodes, see Section II). Indeed, suppose that
m iteratively sends k packets to k random IP addresses (for
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Fig. 4. Three monitors, m1, m2 and m3 are actually colocated, and therefore
they may observe a unique interface for any given target router r(i). They
are redundant regarding the quality of the measurement.
a given integer k) with increasing TTLs: the first k packets
are sent with TTL 1, the k next packets with TTL 2, and so
on. Thanks to the ICMP Time-Exceeded packets issued by
the nodes at distance t from m (we discuss below the case
of machines that do not send such packets), for each value t
of the TTL m discovers a set of interfaces at distance t from
m. We denote this set of interfaces by it(m). Let us denote
by d(m) the smallest t such that |it(m)| > 1: d(m) is the
first TTL at which m discovers more than just one interface.
We have by definition |id(m)(m)| > 1 and |ij(m)| = 1 for all
j < d(m). Then, the (unique) interface seen by m with TTL
d(m)− 1, i.e. the unique element of id(m)(m)) is an interface
of its branching point. See for instance the case of monitor
m1 in Fig. 4, for which d(m1) = 3.
Now, let us consider two monitors m and m′ such that
id(m)(m) = id(m′)(m
′). In other words, the first time m
and m′ see several interfaces they see the exact same ones.
Then certainly having both m and m′ in the monitor set
has little interest for our measurements: m and m′ enter
in the core internet through very close routers (probably
through the same branching point, see Fig. 4) 2. We say that
such monitors are colocated. The number of non-colocated
monitors in M is a key value for estimating the quality of
M : it basically represents the number of significantly different
locations hosting monitors in M .
In the scheme we just described, we ignored machines that
do not send ICMP Time-Exceeded packets. Because of them,
we may erroneously decide that some monitors are colocated;
this means that we under-estimate the quality of our monitor
set, which has no important consequence in our context: the
quality is only under-estimated. Similarly, it is possible that
two monitors m and m′ have different branching points but
satisfy id(m)(m) = id(m′)(m′). Again, this would make us
under-estimate the quality of the monitor set and therefore we
may safely ignore this. Conversely, some monitors m and m′
may have different but similar sets id(m)(m) and id(m′)(m′),
indicating that they are not colocated but located close from
each other. It may be interesting to use this for a more subtle
assessment of the level of distribution of monitors, but we
2Notice that this does not mean that such monitors have no interest at all
and should be discarded: they may lead to observation of different interfaces
of the target, in particular if it implements per-destination load-balancing [17].
leave this for further work.
B. Diversity of views
In the approach above, we estimate an intrinsic quality
of a monitor set M as the number of different locations
hosting a monitor. A complementary view is obtained by
evaluating the quality of a measurement from M towards
targets in a set T . For instance, one may evaluate the quality
of M as the number of distinct interfaces observed from M :
Q0(M) =
∑
t∈T |M(t)|. Clearly, if Q0(M ′) > Q0(M) then
M ′ may be considered as better than M . More subtle quality
functions may be defined. In particular, it is interesting to
take into account the fact that interfaces of low-degree routers
are easier to observe than the ones of high-degree routers.
This leads to the quality function Q1(M) =
∑
t∈T |M(t)|d(t)
where d(t) stands for the degree of target router r(t). Of course
we do not have the value of d(t) and approximate it using the
results of our measurements.
Given a quality function Q like the ones above, one may
assess the impact of the addition of a new monitor m to the
current monitor set, by calculating Q(M) and Q(M ∪ {m}).
Ideally, one wants to maximize Q to collect the most accurate
set of observed interfaces while keeping M as small as
possible to prevent redundant measurements (which may be
costly).
In practice, we will want to assess a given monitor set M ,
and to do so we will start from an empty monitor set and
compute the expected quality improvement when monitors are
added one by one, in a random order. The quality is expected
to grow with the number of monitors, and then to reach a
steady or almost steady regime meaning that adding more
monitors would not improve the measurement significantly. Of
course, if many monitors are colocated (for instance, if they
are all at the same location), the quality will have precisely this
behavior (as adding more monitors at the same location does
not significantly improve the measurement). This is why this
quality function approach is complementary to the colocation-
based one: we will perform first the colocation and then
plot the behavior of the quality function when non-colocated
monitors are added, see Section IX-A.
C. Convergence of observations
Last but not least, a clear way to assess the quality of a
given monitor set regarding our measurements objectives is
to directly observe how the observed fraction pk of routers of
degree k converges when the number of monitors grows, for all
k. Here again, we expect these fractions to converge rapidly
to a steady value, which is our final estimate. This would
indicate that the last monitors we added were not necessary,
and thus that we obtain an accurate view. For the same reasons
as above, this is complementary to colocation analysis.
V. TARGETS
Being able to sample a core router uniformly at random in
the internet 3 would help us much, but there is no direct way
3Uniformly at random means that all possible elements are sampled with
the same probability.
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Fig. 5. If we target an interface i that belongs to a border router r(i) then our
measurements may see more than one interface for r(i). However, only one
of them does not belong to B(M), as displayed in this picture: all interfaces
of B(M) are marked with a small dash.
to do so. Instead, it is trivial to get IP addresses uniformly
at random, as they are nothing but 32 bit integers. Of course,
sampling such a random integer does not necessarily give a
relevant IP address with regards to our measurement needs: it
may for instance belong to an end-host or a router that does
not answer our probes.
In this section, we show how to sample uniformly at random
an interface of an internet core router that correctly answers
our probes, which we call a correct core router. From this
sampling, which is not a uniform sampling of core routers
themselves but only of the interfaces of some of them, we
show in Section VI how to estimate the degree distribution of
all internet core routers.
First notice that a core router may give incorrect answers
to our probes. In particular, it may give no answer at all, or
it may always answer using the same interface independently
of the monitor 4. In these cases, our measurement procedure
discovers zero or one interface for the corresponding target.
Instead, if the target address belongs to a correct core router,
our measurements see at least two of its interfaces (as long as
monitors are reasonably well distributed). Therefore, we are
able to distinguish between correct core routers and other core
routers.
There is no reason to assume that the degree of core routers
is correlated to whether they answer correctly to our probes or
not. Indeed, low-degree core routers may a priori misbehave
as well as high-degree ones, and conversely. As a consequence,
the degree distribution of correct core routers is the same as
the degree distribution of all core routers. We therefore focus
on correct core routers here.
Let us now consider the IP address i corresponding to a
32 bit integer sampled uniformly at random. If it belongs to
a known class of reserved addresses [21], if it belongs to no
machine in the internet, if it belongs to a machine that does not
answer to our probes, or if it belongs to an end-host, then our
measurements see only one or zero interface for it: |M(i)| ≤ 1.
As a consequence, we are able to distinguish between these
cases and the one where i belongs to a correct core router.
If the target address i belongs to a border router r(i), then
4Of course, more intricate behaviors are also possible, but they are very
unlikely [16] and we ignore them here.
in most cases (see Fig. 2 (right)) our measurements see only
one interface. In some cases, though, we may see more than
just one interface, see Fig. 5. Indeed, let us denote by B(M)
the set of all interfaces seen between monitors in M and the
core internet in the process described in Section IV-A: with
the notations of this section, B(M) = ∪m∈M ∪k<d(m) ik(m).
By construction, all IP addresses in B(M) belong to border
routers, and they are all such interfaces one may observe from
monitors in M , see Fig. 5. Conversely, if the target address
belongs to a border router, then this router may have interfaces
in B(M), and these interfaces are seen from monitors in M .
The key point here is that, our measurements see only one
interface not in B(M) for such routers. Therefore, we are
able to distinguish them from correct core routers (for which
we observe at least two interfaces not in B(M)).
In summary, we build target sets as follows. We sample
random 32 bit integers and select the corresponding IP address
i if and only if probes to i lead to observation of at least two
interface not in B(M). Such an IP address is called a valid
target. It is sampled uniformly at random among interfaces of
correct core internet routers.
VI. BIAS CORRECTION
The procedure described in previous section samples uni-
formly at random IP addresses of interfaces of correct core
routers, which we assume to be representative of all core
routers. However, it does not sample uniformly at random
correct core routers themselves: one has k possibilities to
sample a router with k interfaces, so high-degree routers
appear with probability higher than low-degree ones. More
precisely, the probability to sample a router is proportional
to its degree k, and so the observed fraction p′k of routers
sampled with this bias having degree k is proportional to k
times the fraction pk of routers sampled uniformly at random
with degree k: p′k ∼ k · pk. As a consequence, we obtain:
pk =
p′k
k
·
1
∑
i>1
p′
i
i
where the second term is nothing but a normalization constant
to ensure that
∑
k pk = 1.
We may therefore use this formula to infer the true degree
distribution pk from the observed one p′k. However, p′k is the
fraction of core routers with k core interfaces: our measure-
ments see the core interfaces of core routers, not their border
interfaces (see Section II). We therefore have to ensure that
the target generation procedure described in previous section
samples core interfaces (of core routers) uniformly at random.
To obtain this, we discard targets that turn out to be border
interfaces. We detect them as follows: they are not observed
during our measurements except if they belong to B(M). In
other words, a target interface i of a correct core router is a
border interface if and only if i 6∈M(i) or i ∈ B(M).
Finally, in addition to the sampling procedure described in
Section V, we discard these targets. We then get from the
other targets the value of p′k and infer the unbiased pk using
the formula above.
Notice that the sampling bias towards high-degree routers
has an important benefit. Indeed, we expect high-degree
routers to be relatively rare (which will be confirmed by our
measurements, see Section VIII) and thus we may miss them.
Uniform sampling would indeed lead to a probability pk to
sample a router with degree k, but with our biased sampling
this probability is proportional to k · pk, and thus higher for
high-degree routers. This leads to a better estimate of pk when
k is large, while for small values of k the quality of the
estimate is ensured by the prevalence of low-degree routers.
VII. MEASUREMENT
We present in this section a practical measurement we
conducted following our approach. We describe the whole
procedure step by step, as well as the obtained dataset.
We first built an initial target set by sending (from a machine
in our lab) a probe to the IP addresses corresponding to
32 bit integers sampled uniformly at random. We stopped
this process when we obtained correct answers (i.e. ICMP
Destination Unreachable (Code 3/Port unreachable)) from 3
millions such targets (we considered that no answer would
arrive after 1 minute). This took approximately 10 hours.
Our initial monitor set was composed of the approximately
700 machines of the PlanetLab platform [4], which is a
distributed infrastructure provided to researchers typically to
conduct network measurements. Some of these potential mon-
itors are colocated and some do not fit our requirements (they
have very poor connections, for instance, or they belong to
networks that filter ICMP packets). We will handle these issues
below.
Given these initial target and monitor sets, we uploaded
our measurement tools and the target set to each monitor
and remotely asked them to send a probe to each target
(in a random order to avoid situations where targets would
receive many probes in a short period of time). This lasted
approximately 4 hours (and so each target received at most
700 probes during this period). In order to explore the stability
of our measurements, we repeated this operation three times
in a row. The whole measurement (building the target set and
probing each of them from each monitor three times) took
less than 24 hours, with a very reasonable load for targets and
monitors. At this stage, we obtained for each target its answers
to the probes from all monitors (repeated three times), which
we gathered onto a local machine for analysis.
Some targets and some monitors behaved incorrectly. For
instance, some targets sent several answers for a unique probe.
Others answered to a few monitors only, probably because of
shutdowns during measurements, very low ICMP rate limiting,
or other specific reasons. Conversely, some monitors received
surprisingly few answers, probably due to a very poor local
connections, shutdowns, or to the fact that PlanetLab machines
may be overloaded (they are shared by numerous users). To
avoid potential noise due to these anomalous behaviors, we
first discarded targets giving multiple answers to a probe.
We then observed for each monitor the number of targets
that answered its probes, and conversely for each target the
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Fig. 6. Left (resp. right): for each number x on the horizontal axis, we plot
the number of targets (resp. monitors) that sent (resp. received) at least x
answers to our probes, for each of our three measurements.
1-st 2-nd 3-rd
Nb running monitors 619 625 622
Nb answering targets 2849740 2734548 2699642
Nb targets answering incorrectly 10150 9842 11048
Nb monitors receiving answers
from less than 80% of targets
198 183 180
Nb targets answering to less than
80% of monitors
590605 527346 544252
Nb targets t such that t 6∈M(t) 2634226 2519320 2484483
Nb interfaces in B(M) 1040 1107 1097
Nb targets with only one interface
not in B(M)
2842481 2727422 2692135
Final number of targets 5593 5623 5619
TABLE I
KEY POST-PROCESSING STEPS FOR OUR THREE MEASUREMENTS.
number of monitors that received answers from it, see Fig. 6.
These plots show that most monitors received answers from
most targets, as we expected. To ensure that we only keep
relevant data, we discarded monitors that received answers to
less than 80% of their probes, and conversely all targets that
sent answers to less than 80% of probes; this represents a
minority of all monitors and targets, see Table I.
Following the requirements of our method, we then built the
set B(M) of border interface seen from our monitors and we
discarded all targets t such that t is not in the set of interfaces
used bt r(t) to answer probes (i.e. t 6∈M(t)) or t is a border
interface (t ∈ B(M)), see Sections V and VI. Finally, we
discarded all targets having only one interface not in B(M)
(which, as explained in Section V, do not belong to correct
core routers).
We give the precise numbers encountered during the whole
process for our three measurements in Table I.
We finally obtain for each of our three measurements
approximately 5600 targets belonging to correct core routers.
The key output of our measurements is the observed degree
of these routers, from which we will estimate the degree
distribution of internet core routers in the next section.
VIII. RESULTS
The degree distributions observed from our three measure-
ments, after bias correction following the formula of Sec-
tion VI, are given in Table II. We plot the inverse cumulative
distributions in Fig. 7.
First notice that results from each measurements are very
similar, which confirms that our results are stable in this setup.
Obtained distributions show clearly that low-degree core
routers are prevalent: approximately 75% of them have degree
deg 1-st 2-nd 3-rd
2 0.74770 0.74371 0.75214
3 0.19434 0.19838 0.19258
4 0.02727 0.02727 0.02585
5 0.01551 0.01588 0.01486
6 0.00708 0.00640 0.00644
7 0.00206 0.00224 0.00230
8 0.00175 0.00196 0.00147
9 0.00127 0.00131 0.00145
10 0.00057 0.00044 0.00052
11 0.00056 0.00052 0.00047
12 0.00040 0.00044 0.00047
13 0.00020 0.00023 0.00017
14 0.00025 0.00031 0.00031
15 0.00032 0.00009 0.00017
deg 1-st 2-nd 3-rd
16 0.00014 0.00025 0.00024
17 0.00023 0.00018 0.00015
18 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007
19 0.00007 0.00009 0.00009
20 0.00002 0.00000 0.00002
21 0.00008 0.00015 0.00008
22 0.00006 0.00000 0.00004
23 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002
24 0.00002 0.00000 0.00002
25 0.00000 0.00005 0.00002
26 0.00000 0.00002 0.00002
27 0.00002 0.00000 0.00002
28 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000
29 0.00002 0.00000 0.00001
TABLE II
THE DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS OBTAINED FROM OUR THREE
MEASUREMENTS (AFTER BIAS CORRECTION): FOR EACH DEGREE k, WE
GIVE THE ESTIMATED FRACTION pk OF CORE ROUTERS WITH DEGREE k.
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Fig. 7. Inverse cumulative degree distribution obtained from our three
measurements, after bias correction: for each value x on the horizontal axis,
we plot the fraction of core routers having degree higher than or equal to x
(log-log scale).
2 only, and almost 20% have degree 3. This is not surprising,
as we observe core interfaces only: these routers certainly have
other interfaces connected to border routers and/or end-hosts.
The number of interfaces they use to actually route traffic in
the core internet, however, is very low.
Instead, some core routers have much larger degrees, and
the highest one we observe is 29. We may possibly miss a
few interfaces of this router but, as explained above, there is
little chance that the true largest degree is much higher: we
perform measurements from a much larger number of monitors
and so the fact that observed degrees are bounded by this
number plays no role. Of course, core routers with degree
significantly higher than 29 may exist, and they probably
do. There is however none in our random target set and we
therefore expect them to be extremely rare (which is reinforced
by the sampling bias towards high-degree routers explained at
the end of Section VI).
Going further, we observe that the first values of the
obtained distribution (pk for k < 10) are reasonably well fitted
by a power-law (a straight line in the log-log plot of Figure 7).
After that, the distribution decreases less rapidly and finally it
experiences a sharp decrease. The first values are the ones that
our method estimates best, and so one may ask if the obtained
distribution is compatible with a power-law. As highest degree
may be under-estimated, this may even be in accordance with
the shape of the whole obtained distribution.
In order to explore this question, we compute the range
of power-law exponents compatible with the first values (the
most reliable ones). We obtain α ∈ [3.8; 4.4]. Beyond the
actual numerical value of the exponent, this discards the usual
assumption of an exponent close to 2 and this shows that
if the true degree distribution is a power-law, it is hardly
dinstinguishable from an exponential decrease in practice [22]
even for a system the size of the internet.
Finally, although fully characterizing the degree distribution
for large values of the degree remains to be done, our
measurement shows that it significantly differs from classical
assumptions: it is very heterogeneous but it experiences a
much sharper decrease compatible with power-law exponents
between 3.8 and 4.4.
IX. ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS
In this section, we explore two approaches to assess the
quality and robustness of our results. We first study the
quality of our monitor set following the methods described
in Section IV. We then run simulations similar to the ones in
Section III to show that our results are self-consistent.
A. Quality of the monitor set
As explained in Section IV-A, the distributed nature of
our monitor set is a key feature for our measurements. We
therefore ran the procedure described in this section to iden-
tify classes of colocated monitors, which provide basically
redundant information. We obtained 203 different classes,
each containing in average 2.11 monitors. This is consistent
with the fact that each institution involved in PlanetLab often
contributes with several monitors located at the same place.
Examination of the DNS names of monitors belonging to
a same class confirmed this: they typically match the same
*.domain.tld pattern.
Once colocated monitors are identified, we investigate the
diversity of views obtained from various locations, as ex-
plained in Section IV-B: we first estimate the quality of the
monitor set when only one colocation class is used, then
two colocation classes, etc, until all colocation classes (and
thus all monitors) are used. We add colocation classes in a
random order and average the obtained quality. The result
is displayed in Fig. 8 (left). As expected, for both quality
functions, the quality increases sharply at the beginning and
rapidly converges. This indicates that adding more monitors
at more locations would not improve the results much, and so
that our monitor set and the number of locations hosting them
are reasonable.
In order to deepen this, we examine the impact of adding
more monitors at more locations on the observed fraction pk
of core routers with degree k (which is what we are interested
in), as discussed in Section IV-C. We add colocation classes
one by one like above and observe how pk evolves and obtain
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Fig. 8. Left: evolution of the quality of the monitor set when we add
colocation classes. Right: convergence of the fraction of routers of degree
k with the number of colocation classes.
Fig. 8. The estimates for small degrees rapidly converges,
which was expected as only few monitors (and locations) are
needed to observe them. Interestingly, only very few locations
(approximately 10) are needed to obtain an estimate of pk
for k < 5 with a 80% precision. Increasing the number of
monitors rapidly increases the quality of the estimate. Even for
large degrees, the estimate rapidly reaches a value comparable
to the final one, despite the fact that it only slowly converges
after that.
Finally, this work on the monitor set shows that we have
200 significantly different locations hosting monitors, and that
this is sufficient to ensure a reasonable quality for our results.
It is clear however that increasing the number of monitors
and the number of locations hosting them would increase both
accuracy and reliability of our estimates.
B. Simulation bootstrap
We demonstrated the relevance of our approach by simulat-
ing it on artificial graphs in Section III. In the lack of a better
knowledge, we used two extreme degree distributions: Poisson
and power-law ones. We conduct here similar simulations but
with the degree distribution obtained in Section VIII from our
measurements. We expect our method to be able to observe
this distribution accurately, otherwise the estimate we obtain
above would make little sense.
We built 5 random graphs of 1 million nodes 5 according to
each of the 3 measured distributions; these graphs represent
the core internet in our simulations. For each graph, we then
sampled 5 different sets of nodes at random to play the role
of monitors. This leads to 75 different simulations, for which
we tested sets of 12, 25, 50, 100, 200, 400 and 800 monitors.
As our monitors cannot be colocated in this framework (the
considered graphs have no border), the simulations most
similar to our PlanetLab measurements are the one with 200
monitors.
Fig. 9 (left) displays the degree distributions observed with
different sets of monitors. It shows that 200 monitors in
different locations is sufficient to observe the real degree
distribution, even if the fraction of high-degree nodes is less
accurate than others. The plot shows that the proportion of
small degree nodes is particularly well approximated: 95% of
5Remind that the size of the graph has little impact on the obtained results,
see Section III.
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Fig. 9. Assessment by simulations. Left: the observed degree distributions
with various numbers of monitors. Right: correlations between observed and
real degree with 200 monitors (one dot per node and median).
all nodes with degree less than or equal to 10 are observed
with their real degree with 200 monitors.
We deepen this by studying how close the observed degree
of a node is to its real degree, see Fig. 9 (right). This figure
confirms that our method succeeds in measuring the degree of
specific nodes. In particular, the median value remains close to
the real one, even for the highest degrees. Moreover, even for
the highest degrees, the estimated degree is never far from the
real one. For instance, 18 has been the worst estimate made
for a 29-degree node; 17 for a 27-degree one and 18 for a 24-
degree one. Given the fact that these are worst cases and that
we cannot over-estimate a degree, such errors remain quite
low.
In conclusion, simulations of our method are in accordance
with our empirical measurements: the global degree distri-
bution (which is our focus here) observed in simulations is
consistent with the real one, and the estimate of the degree of
specific nodes is very accurate as long as their degree is not
too high. Increasing the number of monitors would provide
better estimates of the fraction of high-degree nodes, without
drastically changing our conclusions.
X. RELATED WORK
The physical and IP-level internet topologies are extensively
studied since the seminal papers of Pansiot et al. [23] and
Faloutsos et al. [24]. The most classical approach consists in
building maps from traceroute-like measurements. However,
several studies have shown that obtained maps are intrinsically
biased [10], [11], [9], [25], [12], [13], [14], [8], and even that
traceroute outputs are unreliable [17], [26], [8]. The hope that
increasing the size and quality of maps would overcome these
issues has led to much effort, but the situation remains far
from satisfactory [9], [27], [14].
Conducting precise measurements of the degree of random
nodes to obtain a reliable estimate of the degree distribution
was first suggested in [10]. We explored the possibility to
do so at IP level in [28] but we only partly succeeded and
we conducted thorough simulations in [20]. Property-driven
network measurement are also developed in other contexts, in
particular Online Social Networks (OSNs) and P2P overlays.
Our work is also closely related to alias resolution (which
plays a key role in the building of maps): while we seek all
(unknown) interfaces of a given router identified by one of its
interfaces, alias resolution aims at identifying in a given set
of interfaces the ones that belong to a same router [29], [30],
[15], [16]. Probes similar to ours are used in this context, in
particular by the iffinder tool [31], as well as other techniques.
Our use of such probes was clearly inspired by these works.
Finally, important efforts are devoted to the deployment
of large and distributed measurements infrastructures, which
are crucial for this field of research [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
Some of them distribute monitoring capabilities at a huge scale
(typically onto thousands of end-hosts) and so are particularly
promising for us [5], [2].
XI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we have obtained an estimate of the degree
distribution of internet core routers in a rigorous way, which
makes it much more reliable than previous estimates obtained
from maps. To do so, we focused on the measurement of
this property rather than the collection of a large (but still
partial, biased and erroneous) map of the whole internet. This
made it possible to design, implement and run a measurement
grounded on reasonable and well identified assumptions.
Our method also has the advantage that various assessments
of its results are possible. Here, in addition to the repeated
measurements, we assessed the results using variations of
the monitor set and simulations. Exploring other assessment
approaches would increase their reliability. In particular, one
may run various anti-aliasing techniques on the results of our
measurements in order to confirm that the different interfaces
we discover for a given target do belong to a same router. One
may also run our measurements on targets for which the true
degree is known, thus providing ground truth assessment.
In another direction, one may of course use larger sets of
targets in order to improve the accuracy of our estimate, in
particular regarding high-degree nodes. As the measurements
we presented took only 4 hours, doing so seems easy. Using
more and better distributed monitors would be another impor-
tant improvement. Up to our knowledge, the most promising
infrastructures for doing so are DIMES and RIPE Atlas
[2], [5]: they already provide thousands of well distributed
monitors which fit our measurement requirements.
Finally, let us notice that our measurement method is very
fast and induces only a small load both on monitors and
targets. This is an important feature, which makes it possible
to avoid bias due to dynamics during the measurement It
also opens the way to studies of the dynamics of the degree
distribution at an unprecedented time scale. Going further, one
may even observe the time evolution of router interfaces and
use this for better modeling of the internet and its dynamics.
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